Starting from the US Sky
Introduction
Recently, in the debate over the global environmental issues implied by the exploding path of greenhouse gas emissions, a US private non-profit organization, the Sky Trust 1 , defends the following idea: starting from the widely shared statement that the atmosphere's carbon absorption capacity is limited, they suggest to mandate a trust with the mission to administer a cap-and-trade program for carbon permits, organize auctions of these permits to polluting firms and redistribute the proceeds of the auctions equally to all citizens. The reason called upon for these transfers to the citizens is that "the sky belongs to all [the citizens] equally." So, according to them, the owners of the sky should be compensated for its use by polluters and, moreover, they should be compensated equally because they have in common to be equally members of the community of owners.
While the instrument of permits is well-known in environmental economics (Dales (1968), Montgomery (1972) , Stokey (1998) ) and is now being applied on a wide-scale for carbon emissions in Europe, the practice is essentially to give them for free to firms and to let them trade with each other to match their needs. The European Trading System allows for a maximum of 5% of the initial allocations to be auctioned during the firt period of the program. In the US, the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 does not put any upper bound on the number of permits that will be distributed for free to firms.
This article has a twofold objective. First it grounds the Sky Trust design in an overlapping generations framework. This implies, on the one hand, to give a formal definition of the membership to the community of owners of the atmosphere and, on the other hand, to allow for the diversity of the "selves and egos" which characterizes this community. This is done by distinguishing two sources through which generations consent to the use of the environment: a consent common to all generations and another consent specific to any given generation. Second, this article proposes an institutional design whose aim is to reflect both the features of equal membership and diversity of the owners. This institutional design combines a fund, like the one proposed in the Sky Trust Initiative, with a voting procedure aimed at fixing the amount of resource invested in environmental maintenance. It is shown under which conditions the combination of these two institutions may solve the tradeoff between accumulation of wealth and preservation of the environment. Section 4 studies the business-as-usual economy. Section 5 introduces the institutions to conduct environmental policy. Sections 6 to 8 present respectively the temporary equilibria, the characterization of the intertemporal equilibrium and the steady state equilibria. Section 9 deals with the dynamics and studies the regime switches which the economy experiences on the transitional path. Section 10 analyzes the effects on the equilibrium of the introduction of the environmental policy institutions starting from a steady state business-as-usual equilibrium. Finally section 11 concludes.
The twofold consent of the generations and the proposed institutional design
Underlying the Sky Trust assertion that "the sky belongs to all of us equally", there is the general idea that the environment can be considered as a global public good whose ownership falls on the whole mankind. Pollution then represents a negative externality which deteriorates the quantity of that public good. At the heart of the economic approach to environmental issues lies the question of how much pollution society would tolerate. This preferred level of pollution can be used as a target by policymakers in designing and implementing environmental policies.
The very concept of mankind ownership of the environment is however problematic because it abstracts from two relevant features in environmental issues: the flow of time and the finite length of human lives. Taking into account the first feature forces to envision many environmental policies in an intertemporal setting. The second feature implies that mankind is actually a community which undergoes a process of continuous population renewal. Being finitelylived, many members of that community will never meet each other. When it exists, the connection between two community members does not last for their whole respective lifespans since these only partially overlap. Thus, contrary to a static view, the community of all mankind consists of a collection of "selves and egos" which seem to be connected to each other only if they overlap. These considerations then suggest that, as regards environmental issues, the concept of mankind ownership is an interesting one only if this community of owners is apprehended as a community of overlapping selves. Because such an overlapping structure may cause agents to neglect the long term impact of their decisions, Solow (1986) recommended the use of the overlapping generation model to study nature resource issues.
This article builds upon the class of overlapping generations growth model. We shall however defend the idea that, though imperfectly connected, all members  of all generations share the feeling that they could be born at any point of time and we shall interpret this feeling of anonymous membership as a version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance idea. In this article, we propose an institutional design to take into account both the overlapping and the anonymous characteristics of mankind community members.
The analysis starts as follows. We assume that all generations regard the environment as an intergenerational public good and polluting emissions E as a negative externality. Initially there are no policies to reduce the pollution externality. The economy is on its laissez-faire equilibrium path, which we will refer to as the business-as-usual (BAU) equilibrium. The BAU equilibrium is a path which is either stationary or non-stationary. In the case of a stationary path, the emissions are constant at the level E bau and the environmental quality is stabilized, but at a non-optimal level.
In the case of a non-stationary BAU path, either the economy converge to a non-optimal steady state, or it collapses. This means that either polluting emissions follow an increasing path and the environment deteriorates but degradation dampens at the steady state, or emissions increase so much that they end up outreaching the maximum sustainable long run emissionsĒ. As a result, there is no steady state: the environment and the economy collapse.The scope of this section is twofold. We discuss the motivations to improve upon the BAU equilibrium path and, simultaneously, we propose institutions which are a variety of the Sky Trust proposal design and represent means to improve upon the BAU.
The common consent and the constitutional fund
In general, there are several conceivable transitions from the BAU equilibrium to a regulated equilibrium. A severe reduction in the polluting emissions could be implemented at the beginning, followed by a growing emissions path only up to what the environment can absorb (Bréchet, Lambrecht and Prieur (2005)). Alternatively, a soft transition would consist in gradually tightening the constraint. We shall explore here a third possibility which boils down to a Rawlsian implementation of the Sky Trust initiative.At some period on the BAU equilibrium path, all generations, both present and future ones, fictitiously meet to agree on how much to improve environmental quality. All generations are assumed to be ignorant of their date of birth and therefore share an anonymous membership to the community of owners of the atmosphere. This view is a version of Rawls's (1971) idea of the veil of ignorance. We assume that all members of all generations have the same utility function. Behind the veil of ignorance,  everybody reasons as if he could be born at any point in time, including in bad times. We denote by common consent the ex ante agreement reached by these generations and give the following definition:
definition. The common consent is the path of maximum polluting emissions on which all generations could agree behind the veil of ignorance.
We now characterize the properties of the common consent of all generations behind the veil of ignorance.
proposition 2.1. Property of the common consent Given the willingness to depart from the BAU equilibrium path, the common consent is characterized by a constant sequence of polluting emissions (S) +∞ t=0 which verifies:
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Admittedly, the fiction of the veil of ignorance enables to side-step the issue of the external effects of present decisions on future generations. But, more importantly, it does not imply that any path of emissions can be a candidate for the common agreement. Indeed the ignorance of the date of birth restricts the range of common-consent paths to be constant-emission paths avoiding the environmental disaster and improving upon the BAU stationary emissions. Obviously, this leaves room for a large variety of paths. We shall assume that the choice of a particular path, among all eligible paths, is exogenous.
To implement the common consent path of polluting emissions we assume the existence of a Sky Trust type of fund. Public authorities constitutionally mandate a fund to counter environmental degradation by regulating the source of emissions. We assume that the source of pollution is the firms' production. The instrument handled by the fund is a system of pollution permits. The firms need to possess permits to be allowed to pollute. The aggregate volume of permits issued each period must match the common consent emissions S. It is assumed that firms must pay for each unit of polluting emissions. This is equivalent to assume that no permits is given for free to the producing firms and that the fund sells all the permits issued in a given period (See for instance Jouvet, Michel and Rotillon (2005) ). Given the time profile of the common consent path, the fund must issue a fixed volume S of pollution permits each period and this issue must be lower than the BAU emissions E bau or the threshold collapse emissionsĒ.

The stationarity of the fund's policy instrument reflects the idea that all generations are treated equally and this equal treatment stems from the generations' common consent.
The specific consent and the voting procedure on maintenance
However the common consent policy target might appear ex post inadequate to a given generation born at some given period in the sequence of overlapping generations. Several reasons may be called upon to justify this inadequacy: uncertainty, changing tastes, changing wealth and environment. We shall focus on the last two reasons. Income per head changes across time because of capital accumulation. Depending on their date of birth, generations are more or less favored in terms of economic affluence. The changing environmental quality is another source of ex post heterogeneity among all generations. In general, this intergenerational heterogeneity is likely to affect the willingness to pay for the environment. Some generations may express a consent stronger than others. We denote by specific consent this ex post agreement and give the following definition.
definition. The specific consent is the amount of economic resource a given generation is willing to invest in the maintenance of the environment, at a given date.
The specific consent is characterized by two features. First of all, the investment of the specific consent cannot be negative. In other words, no generation can "borrow" on environmental quality. This behaviour would break the common consent. As a consequence there is a non-negativity constraint on the specific consent. The second feature regards the amount invested. Depending on the degree of affluence and the level of environmental quality experienced at a given period, a generation will express a different specific consent. We summarize these features by the following proposition.
proposition 2.2. Property of the specific consent Given the common consent characterized by (S) +∞ t=0 , the specific consent of the time t generation is a non-negative amount of economic resource invested in the maintenance of the environment:
On a non-stationary path of wealth and the environment, the sequence of the specific consents is a non-stationary path.

To deal with this source of ex post heterogeneity among generations, we shall assume the existence of a second institution in charge of preserving the environment. This institution consists in a voting procedure. It is organized each period to cooperatively determine the amount of investment in environmental maintenance each generation is willing to accept. The vote fixes the amount of resources to be levied on the households' income. These collected resources are then invested in the maintenance of the environment. What is here referred to as investment in maintenance are "end-of-pipe" measures like for instance carbon dioxide capture and sequestration. The voting procedure on maintenance operates like a flexibility mechanism. It allows those generations willing to go beyond the common consent to invest in the environment when young and enjoy, when old, a better environment than the one guaranteed by the common consent.
The index of environmental quality
It is instructive to compare our framework with those of other contributions to the literature on growth and the environment in OLG models. Like John and Pecchenino (1994), Ono (2002) assumes that the households' utility is positively related to a so-called index of "environmental quality". In Ono's (2002) contribution, the dynamic equation which governs the evolution of the environmental quality index is of the following type:
where Q t > 0 is environmental quality at time t, (1 − δ Q ) is the rate at which the current environmental quality stock survives in the following period, ε is the rate at which time t emissions E t decrease Q t+1 2 and µ is the rate at which time t investment in maintenance m t increases Q t+1 .
In this section, we first discuss why this index and its associated pattern of dynamics is incompatible with our approach to the twofold consent of the generations and we then derive an alternative index and pattern.
There cannot exist a common consent of all generations if environmental quality valued by individuals evolves according to the dynamics defined by (3.1) and if the investment in maintenance is equal to zero at each period. Under the above specification of the environmental dynamics and with (m t = 0, ∀t), environmental policies cannot rely only on the abatement of emissions E t . Indeed, a quick inspection of the behavior of the environmental stock Q t reveals that any positive emissions' ceiling S fails to guarantee a positive stationary environmental quality Q. Hence a policy consisting in reducing emissions is unable to avoid the environmental collapse. As a consequence, there does not exist a common consent characterized by a stationary volume S, over which all generations could agree behind the veil of ignorance. Indeed, in that original position, no generation can exclude to be born in the catastrophic long run : any S is thus rejected by any generation. The common consent does not exist.
As a corollary of the inexistence of the common consent, the specific consent consisting in investing in the maintenance of the environment is forced to be positive in the long run.
To show this let us now add maintenance to the picture. On the transition path, maintenance may act as a complement of the emissions abatement. It can be positive or equal to zero and it can vary across time. When maintenance is equal to zero for some periods on the transition, only the emissions abatement is operative. Hence, as we showed, if zero maintenance persists, the economy necessarily converges toward collapse. Since any generation would be willing to avoid it, the desired maintenance will necessarily switch to a positive level after some time and stick to it in the long run. The specification defined by (3.1) is not compatible with our interpretation of maintenance in terms of the generation specific consent. Generations born in the long run are not free to invest or not in maintenance. In such a setting, the institutional voting procedure on maintenance is not a thoroughly flexible mechanism.
We need to assume that households value an index of environmental quality whose dynamics are compatible with the existence of a common consent. We propose to derive the index of environmental quality, as valued by households, from the process through which pollutants accumulate through time. As we shall see, an alternative pattern for the environmental dynamics is then derived which is compatible with our approach of the consent of generations.
To do this we first need to describe this process of pollutants accumulation. The concentrations of the polluting emissions in the atmosphere is considered as an intergenerational public bad. By accumulating in the atmosphere, emissions are the source of damages for generations far beyond the generation contemporaneous of the corresponding emissions. We model concentrations in the atmosphere as a single stock M t > 0. The equation which governs the evolution of M t is the following:
According to this equation, the current concentrations stock M t survives in the next period but only up to a fraction 1 − δ M . Thus the parameter δ M is a factor of natural decay. The parameter ε is, as above, the rate at which emissions E t  increase the concentrations of the next period M t+1 . If emissions are equal to zero, the pollution stock M t also tends to zero. This particular steady state of the stock M t corresponds to the case in which the atmosphere is absolutely free from anthropogenic emissions 3 . At the opposite, the stock of concentrations may be arbitrarily large, even if temporarily.
proposition 3.1. The dynamics of the index of environmental quality Let equation (3.2) describe the evolution of the pollutant stock. Let Q define the threshold level of the pollutant stock above which the economy disappears. There exists a common consent of all generations if individuals value the following index of environmental quality:
Given the dynamics of the pollutant stock M t , the dynamics of the index of environmental quality Q t is given by:
The common consent exists and belongs to the set of constant-emission paths (S) +∞ t=0 for which:
In the literature, at odd with our approach, the index of quality is generally not derived from an underlying pollutant stock equation. While the degree of concentrations of polluting emissions in the atmosphere is a matter of fact provided by climatologists, the index of environmental quality which enters the individuals' utility function is an economic concept. The way we construct it is simple. The definition (3.3) restricts the set of values which M t can take to those compatible with economic activity, i.e. lower than the upper boundQ. If the pollutant stock tends to Q, the environmental index tends to zero. In the absence of anthropogenic emissions, the pollutant stock M t tends to zero and the index of quality tends to Q. Therefore the thresholdQ can also be interpreted as the highest attainable environmental quality when emissions out of economic activity are zero.
It is easy to show that the common consent exist, i.e. that it belongs to a non-empty set. The index of environmental quality Q t is defined in the interval 0, Q . If it exists, a steady state Q must belong to this interval. The maximum sustainable long run emissionsĒ are obtained by equating the stationary quality Q to zero and are equal to (δ M /ε) Q. If the BAU path goes toward collapse 0 <Ē < E bau , the common consent of all generations is characterized by the set of all values of S smaller thanĒ. If a steady steady of the BAU path exists 0 < E bau ≤Ē , the common consent belongs to the set defined by S ≤ E bau .
In order to take the specific consent into account, let us add maintenance with the term µm t in the RHS of the dynamic equation (3.4) and assume a stationary maintenance m ≥ 0. It then follows from the above discussion that, under the dynamics defined by (3.4) , the specific consent to invest in environmental maintenance is not constrained to be positive in the long run. When it is equal to zero, we simply get the steady state Q ∈ 0, Q .
The business-as-usual economy
We now turn to the description of the economy. We consider a competitive economy with overlapping generations in which agents have perfect foresight. The population size is constant and normalized to unity: N = 1. In this section, we analyze the BAU economy. In the next section we introduce the two institutions described in section 2: the constitutional fund and the voting procedure.
Output, emissions and profits in the BAU economy
In the BAU economy, a representative firm produces a consumption/investment good Y t according to a constant returns to scale technology. This production generates polluting emissions which, in turn, generate environmentally harmful atmospheric concentrations M t . Beyond the level of concentrations Q, production is annihilated. As long as the pollutant stock falls short this limit threshold, we define the production technology by a Cobb-Douglas type production function:
where A > 0 is an index of productivity, K t ≥ 0 and L t ≥ 0 are capital and labour at time t and ζ t ∈ (0, 1) is the intensity of pollution. We assume 0 < α < 1. Polluting emissions are defined as follows:
with θ > 0. The intensity of pollution ζ t may be written as a function of the ratio between emissions and output:
In the BAU economy, pollution is maximum because there is no environmental policy. This corresponds to the case for which ζ t = 1 and implies :
We assume that the capital is entirely depreciated in the production process. The representative firm is a price taker and maximizes its real profit, which is defined by
The variables L t and K t are respectively labour and capital demands and w t and R t the real wage rate and interest factor, i.e. one plus the interest rate r t .
The first-order conditions of the firm's problem are the following:
where k t = K t /L t is the capital-labor ratio.
Preferences and the households' utility in the BAU economy
Since we want to compare the BAU economy with the regulated economy, we make simplifying assumptions on the BAU economy, in particular, on the opportunities open to households. In the BAU economy, households supply inelastically one unit of labour to the firm for a real wage rate w t and save everything in productive capital: w t = s t . When old they consume all their capital income, principal and interest: R t+1 s t = d t+1 , where R t+1 is the interest factor and d t+1 old age consumption. Households derive utility from old age consumption d t+1 and from environmental quality Q t+1 and their utility is assumed to be loglinear:
where γ > 0 is the weight put on the log of environmental quality. Households maximize their utility under their budget constraint, taking prices as given. Optimal consumption is simply :
The BAU equilibrium
In equilibrium, the labour market clears: L t = N t = 1. Savings of the young at time t − 1, invested in capital, constitutes the current period capital stock: s t−1 = K t . Since the aggregate labor supply is inelastic, the capital-labour ratio is equal to capital per head. Hence, together with the population size equals unity, we have k t = K t /1. So we get s t−1 = k t . Equilibrium wage and interest  factor are:
, where k t is the capital per head. Emissions are equal to output.
Hence the dynamics of k t and those of Q t are given by the following two equations:
A steady state of the BAU economy is a pair k bau , Q bau , with k bau > 0 and Q bau > 0, which solves (4.7) and (4.8) . It is given by:
Hence the following proposition holds.
proposition 4.1. Existence of the BAU steady state equilibrium
There exists a steady state equilibrium in the BAU economy if and only if
Proof. See appendix A.3
When firms are free to pollute, environmental quality in the long run may be dramatically low, or even tend to 0. The higher the output per head, the lower the environmental quality. It is easy to show that the steady state k bau , Q bau is a sink. As an illustration, consider the effect of an increase in the index of overall productivityÃ. The higher the overall productivity indexÃ, the higher the output and thus the higher polluting emissions. A higher overall productivity A is also associated with a steeper curve
wealth and environmental quality evolve in opposite directions: each individual enjoys higher wealth but suffers from a more deteriorated environment.
The economy with environmental policy
We now introduce the institutions of the constitutional fund and the voting procedure, in charge of implementing, respectively, the common and the specific consent of the generations. We describe how the instruments handled by these institutions modify the agents' decisions. We assume from now on that there exists a BAU steady state equilibrium (E bau <Ē) and that the economy is at that steady state when these institutions are introduced. Each period the constitutional fund is mandated to implement the common consent of all generations by inelastically supplying to the firms a global amount S of emissions permits, which satisfies the property of the common consent S < E bau =Ã k bau α . Denote by q t the equilibrium price.
Thus the fund collects each period the amount q t S. We asssume that q t S is entirely distributed during the same period to the young individuals (τ t per head). With N = 1, this yields:
Since there is no heterogeneity among firms, all firms will demand the same amount of permits at the price q t . Let E t be the demand for permits expressed by the representative firm. We need to re-write the production function in order to let appear the three production factors, capital, labour and emissions. Eliminating ζ t from the production function, one gets
The share of capital and labour in production are reduced with respect to the BAU case: α K < α and α L < 1 − α. The firm's profit is then :
The maximization of profit implies :
The voting procedure on the maintenance tax
The second institution is the voting procedure. This procedure cooperatively fixes the amount of the numeraire which, each period, is invested in the maintenance of the environment. To satisfy the properties of the specific consent it must be non-negative and maximize the welfare of the current generation. The tax which finances the investment modifies the individuals' decision making process. When young, individuals divide their income, wage income plus the fund transfer, w t + τ t , between savings in productive capital s t and maintenance of environmental quality m t :  5.2 The voting procedure on the maintenance tax
When old they consume their savings d t+1 :
The technology of maintenance of environmental quality is linear: each unit of good invested increases quality by µ. With environmental maintenance the quality equation (3.4) becomes:
Note N t m t = m t since N t = 1 for each t.
Given the simplifying assumption on the absence of consumption during individuals' youth and given prices, the specific consent characterized by the voted investment in maintenance fully characterizes the individuals' decision making. After substitution of the budget constraints and the definition of environmental quality Q t+1 in the utility function, the household's problem is equivalent to choose the non-negative maintenance tax which maximize utility, i.e.:
The specific consent is characterized by zero maintenance if marginal utility of consumption d t+1 is larger than marginal utility of quality at zero maintenance (m t = 0) , i.e.
1/ [w
otherwise the specific consent is characterized by a strictly positive maintenance (m t > 0). The FOC's are given by 
Let us refer tom t as the desired maintenance which may be positive or negative. Then the specific consent is characterized by
It coincide with the desired maintenance if the latter is positive, otherwise is is equal to zero.


Temporary equilibria
We now study the equilibrium of a single period. We shall first derive the expression for the optimal maintenance in equilibrium. Then we shall study successively the temporary equilibrium with a zero specific consent, i.e. a constrained-maintenance time t equilibrium and then the temporary equilibrium with a positive specific consent, i.e. an unconstrained-maintenance time t equilibrium.
As in the BAU case, the supply of labour is inelastic and labour market equilibrium implies L t = 1. The supply of capital at time t is predetermined:
The new feature with respect to the BAU case is the market for permits. In equilibrium the demand for permits and the inelastic supply of permits must be equal: E t = S, or in intensive terms: e t = S. Equilibrium prices are given by
Also, the fund budget constraint must be balanced (6.2) q (k t , S) S = τ t
The environmental maintenance in equilibrium
Note that the first period income writes in equilibrium
Thus a young individual receives a share 1 − α K of production as first-period income. Given {k 0 , Q 0 } , the time t = 1 equilibrium value of all variables can be computed with maintenance m 0 . Indeed, with m 0 and {k 0 , Q 0 } , we compute next period capital intensity and environmental quality
and old-age consumption
Hence we obtain (k 1 , Q 1 ) , which are the data of the time t = 1 temporary equilibrium. This can be repeated at any time t. We characterize maintenance m t in equilibrium.

The environmental maintenance in equilibrium
proposition 6.1. Environmental maintenance in equilibrium and the non-negativity constraint
The time t equilibrium desired maintenancem t , is a function of the degree of concern for the environment γ, the volume of permits S and the capital stock and environmental quality inherited from the previous period (k t , Q t ) :
The time t equilibrium maintenance m t is given by:
The non-negativity condition on maintenancem t ≥ 0 is equivalent to
The time t equilibrium maintenance depends only on current prices (wage, permit price) and on the inherited environmental quality. The higher the sum of wage income and permits income ((1 − α K )Ak αK t S αE ), the higher the maintenance of the environment. On the contrary, the higher the environmental quality, the lower the maintenance.
Thus, depending on the inherited capital stock and environmental quality, the generation specific consent is positive or equal to zero. The effect of capital is an income effect. The effect of the aggregate amount of permits S is twofold. First, like for capital, there is an income effect since S is a component of the first-period income. Second, the aggregate amount of permits has a substitution effect which is the following. The higher S, i.e. the higher the level of the common consent, the lower the index of quality Q t and thus the higher the willingness to improve environmental quality, i.e. the higher the specific consent.
Let us summarize the above discussion. At any time t the economy experiences a unique equilibrium which is one of two types: either one with positive specific consent , i.e. with unconstrained maintenance or one with zero specific consent, i.e. with constrained maintenance. The two equations which govern the evolution of capital and environmental quality in equilibrium are
Let us now study separately these two types of temporary equilibria. We shall see that they have very different properties.

The zero-specific-consent temporary equilibria
We shall denote the variables in the zero specific consent equilibria with the upperscript "z ", for "zero maintenance". From the above two equations it follows that, when the specific consent is zero, the two equilibrium dynamics of capital and environmental quality are given by k
The following proposition follows.
proposition 6.2. Characterization of zero specific consent temporary equilibria
On the transition path, at a zero specific consent time t temporary equilibrium, environmental quality is independent of capital accumulation. Both capital and quality depend on the common consent of all generations, i.e. the volume of permits S. Capital accumulation is increasing in the common consent S whereas environmental quality is decreasing in S :
When the specific consent is zero, a lower common consent, i.e. tightening the constraint of abatement of emissions, increases environmental quality. But it does so at the expense of the income of the young and, hence, at the expense of capital accumulation. Equilibria with a positive specific consent have very different properties.
The positive-specific-consent temporary equilibria
We denote with the upperscript "p", for "positive maintenance", the variables in positive specific consent equilibria. The equations which govern the equilibrium dynamics of the capital stock and the environmental quality in positive specific consent equilibria are given by k . Thus we plug this expression in the equation in Q t+1 and Q t and then from the households' first period budget constraint, we substitute
The positive-specific-consent temporary equilibria proposition 6.3. Characterization of positive specific consent temporary equilibria
On the transition path, at a positive specific consent time t temporary equilibrium, environmental quality is positively related to capital accumulation:
and capital accumulation verifies
The higher the households' taste for the environment, γ, and the higher the impact of maintenance, µ, the stronger the link between capital accumulation and environmental quality. Environmental quality and capital accumulation are both increasing in the common consent S if and only if S is sufficiently low:
i.e. if and only if the productivity of emissions is high enough:
Proof. See appendix A.5
Hence, at a temporary equilibrium with positive specific consent, if the volume of permits corresponding to the common consent is increased marginally, there is a positive effect on both next period capital accumulation and environmental quality if emissions are scarce and hence their marginal productivity high. Indeed, the increase in S has two effects on capital: a substitution effect and an income effect. The substitution effect is the following: increasing S deteriorates environmental quality and this stimulates the specific consent, i.e. investment in maintenance becomes relatively more interesting in terms of utility. Thus, with an unchanged production, capital accumulation decreases and investment in the environment increases. The income effect comes from an increased production through higher S. It plays through the marginal productivity of emissions. If the income effect dominates the substitution effect, capital is positively affected. This may be called a scarcity rent effect.

Characterization of the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight
In this section we characterize the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight. In the dynamic equation of capital (6.10) and in the one of environmental quality (6.11), we replace desired maintenancem (k t , Q t , S) by its definition. We obtain at each period one of these two dynamic systems: either
for zero specific consent, or
for positive specific consent. Both functions ξ z and ξ p are increasing in k t . In the following proposition, we characterize the equilibrium dynamics of capital.
proposition 7.1. Characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of capital
It is unique and locally stable. At this steady state equilibrium, the impact of a change in the common consent on the level of the capital stock is given by
The impact of an increase in the common consent S is positive if and only if S is sufficiently low
Proof. See appendix A.7
9 Switches in the specific consent on the transition
We now examine the possibility of a switch between one temporary equilibrium with zero specific consent to a temporary equilibrium with positive consent the period after. To do this, let us study the positions of the two loci of points ξ
Thus in the neighbourhood of zero the regime is the one with zero speific consent. The slope at k t = 0 is given by
We know that 
The LHS of (9.3) is positive or zero since S ≤ (δ M /ε)Q. The RHS of (9.3) tends to zero as k t tends to zero and tends to −∞ as k t tends to +∞. It is first  increasing and then decreasing. Its derivative is γµα
Hence it tends to +∞ as k t tends to zero and it tends to −γµ (1 − δ M ) as k t tends to +∞. The maximum of the RHS is reached when capital intensity equals
. proposition 9.1. Regime switches in the specific consent on the transition
There exist at most two regime switches in the specific consent on the equilibrium dynamics. Proof. See appendix A.8
The characteristics of the economy may be incompatible with the existence of any regime switch. In that case, the economy always experiences zero specific consent for any generation, including in the long run if the scale factorQ of the environmental equation is sufficiently higher than the scale factor of the production function A. Figure 1 depicts this case. The equilibrium dynamic is given by the ξ z (k t ) curve.
Equilibrium dynamics with no switch. Starting from the origin, the equilibrium dynamics is always located on the ξ z (k t ) curve.
A limit case is when the zero and the positive consent curve are tangent (see Figure 2) .
Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics, limit case. Starting from the origin, the equilibrium dynamics is located on the ξ z (k t ) curve and passes through the tangency point with the curve ξ p (k t ).
Most of the time there will be two regime switches on the dynamics (see Figure 3 and 4). Assume there exist two regime switches on the dynamics. The economy may follow a path on which it switches only once. Single switch trajectories may occur when the dynamics cross twice, once above the 45
• line (κ l ) and once below the 45 • line (κ h ) (see Figure 3 ).
When the two regime switches are such that ξ p (κ l ) > κ l and ξ p (κ h ) < κ h (figure 3), the economy converges to the positive specific consent steady state equilibrium k p and it experiences a single regime switch if the initial capital lies in the zero specific consent area:
Figure 3 -Equilibrium dynamics with two switches, first case. Starting from the origin, the equilibrium dynamics is located on the ξ z (k t ) curve up to point a, then switches to the ξ p (k t ) curve up to point b and switches back to ξ z (k t ). Figure 4 : Equilibrium dynamics with two switches, second case. Starting from the origin, the equilibrium dynamics is located on the ξ z (k t ) curve up to point a, then switches to the ξ p (k t ) curve up to point b and switches back to ξ z (k t ).

Double switch trajectories may only occur when the dynamics cross each other twice above the 45
• line (see Figure 4) .
When the two regime switches are such that ξ p (κ l ) > κ l and ξ p (κ h ) > κ h (figure 4) and when initial capital intensity verifies k 0 < κ l , the economy converges to the zero specific consent steady state equilibrium k z and experiences a double regime switch : from zero to positive specific consent and then from positive to zero specific consent.
Proof. See appendix A.10
All the cases where the steady state equilibrium is with zero specific consent (cases 1, 2 and 4) are at odd with Ono (2002) in which the specific consent cannot be zero in the long run.
10 The transition from the BAU economy to the economy with policy Until now we have studied the effects of the consents of generations, on capital accumulation and the environment, when these consents and their respective institutions are already operating. In this section, we complete this analysis by studying the impact of the introduction of the two institutions starting from the BAU economy. Remind that the BAU economy is assumed to be initially at the BAU steady state equilibrium k bau , Q bau .
proposition 10.1. The transition from the BAU equilibrium to the equilibrium with policy
Let the initial equilibrium be the business-as-usual steady state k bau , Q bau .
At some given date t 0 , assume that (i) a common consent is chosen, through the setting of a limit to emissions (S < E bau ), and implemented by a constitutional fund which is mandated to sell each period the volume S of permits to the firms and to redistribute the proceeds of the permits sales to the young households and that (ii) each period the specific consent is expressed through a voting procedure which determines the level of maintenance.
The environmental quality at time t 0 increases and converges to a higher level in the long run. The capital per head increases and converges to a higher level if and only if at time t 0 It is thus easy to increase environmental quality in the short run (Q t0+1 ) but less easy to maintain this higher level in the long run. The critical factor is the impact on the wealth of the economy. If the policy harms seriously the capital accumulation process, there is a probability that the advantage gained in environmental quality partially melts down on the transition path. On the contrary, if the policy enhances the capital accumulation process, the short run gain on quality can be increased on the transition path. Here is an example of such a scenario.
example. At the BAU equilibrium k bau = (1 − α)Ã k bau α . Suppose the specific consent remains equal to zero both in the short and the long run. This might be because for any level of capital intensity ξ z < ξ p .
When the constitutional fund implements the common consent S it actually implements a steady value of the degree of pollution, ζ ∈ (0, 1) ,
. Hence the aggregate volume of permits sold to the firms writes
with 0 < ζ < 1. As a result the contribution of permits to production, S αE , can be written as a function of the BAU emissions
Taking into account this expression for S αE , the time t 0 + 1 capital intensity can be re-written as
The comparison of k t0+1 and k bau shows that the common consent implemented by the fund not only increases environmental quality at time t 0 + 1 but also foster capital accumulation if the degree of pollution ζ is set in the following interval:
On the transition, capital per head and environmental quality both jump up at time t 0 + 1 and then monotonically increase and converge to their new steady state (k z , Q z ) . The price of permits also follows a monotonically increasing path toward its steady value q z = q (k z , S) .

The interpretation of this example runs as follows. The parameter θ, which appears in α K = αθ/ (1 + θ) , and comes from the emissions equation (4.2), influences the volume of emissions for a given output Y t . It also influences the degree of the redistribution of output between factor owners, at the benefit of the young households.
The higher θ is, the lower the share of emissions in output α E , the higher the one of capital α K , hence the closer α K is to α. In other words, the closer is the share of the young in production in the regulated economy (1 − α K ), with respect to the share of the young in the BAU economy (1 − α). This means that the redistribution of production to the young through permits sales recycling is low.
The range of ζ values verifying the above condition may be narrow. The smaller the redistribution effect to the young households, the smaller the range of ζ values over which both capital accumulation and environmental quality can be enhanced. 
The short run gain is multiplied by a factor 1/δ M in the long run. So this is potentially important even if the short gain is low.
To get an idea of the magnitude of the interval ((1 − α)(1 − α K ), 1), and of the environmental gain, let us set α = 0.3. Consider two values of θ: θ = 2 and θ = 5. The latter corresponds to the smallest redistribution of output. We respectively get: This short study of the environmental effects of the common consent policy sheds light on the possibilities to leave capital accumulation unchanged while still improving environmental quality in a non-marginal fashion.
Conclusion
Starting from the US Sky Trust claim that the "the sky belong to us equally", this paper distinguishes two sources through which overlapping generations may consent to pay for the environment whom they are the owners: the common consent of all generations reached behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance and the specific consent of generation born at a given period. It proposes two institutions: a fund, which implements the common consent, is mandated to sell permits to firms and to redistribute the proceeds to the young households and a voting procedure, designed to implement the specific consent, fixes a tax on the young households to finance an investment in environmental maintenance.
The analysis shows how the specific consent may be operative or inoperative on the transition path and that there may be at most two regime switches. It highlights the interaction between the common consent and the specific consent.
Starting from the BAU steady state, the introduction of the institutions of the fund and the voting procedure always immediately increases the environmental quality but this gain may be temporary and partially vanishes if capital accumulation is strongly evicted by the policy. On the opposite, we stress a case in which the introduction of the policy has beneficial effects both on wealth and quality, simply because the permits, on the one hand, help reducing the source of pollution and, on the other hand, generate a revenue which is redistributed to savers and thus enhance capital accumulation. 
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